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New Modes of Pluralist Global Governance 
 
Gráinne de Búrca,* Robert O. Keohane,** and Charles Sabel*** 
     January 25, 2013 
Abstract: 
 
This paper describes three modes of pluralist global governance. Mode One refers to the 
creation and proliferation of comprehensive, integrated international regimes on a variety of 
issues. Mode Two describes the emergence of diverse forms and sites of cross-national decision 
making by multiple actors, public and private as well as local, regional and global, forming 
governance networks and “regime complexes,” including the orchestration of new forms of 
authority by international actors and organizations. Mode Three, which is the main focus of the 
paper, describes the gradual institutionalization of practices involving continual updating and 
revision, open participation, an agreed understanding of goals and practices, and monitoring, 
including peer review. We call this third mode Global Experimentalist Governance.  
Experimentalist Governance arises in situations of complex interdependence and pervasive 
uncertainty about causal relationships. Its practice is illustrated in the paper by three examples: 
the arrangements devised to protect dolphins from being killed by tuna fishing practices; the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; and the Montreal Protocol on the Ozone 
Layer. Experimentalist Governance tends to appear on issues for which governments cannot 
formulate and enforce comprehensive sets of rules, but which do not involve fundamental 
disagreements or high politics, and in which civil society is active. The paper shows that 
instances of Experimentalist Governance are already evident in various global arenas and issue 
areas, and argues that their significance seems likely to grow. 
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It is by now a commonplace that international law and world politics is less and less dominated 
by states even as it becomes more and more pluralist. Tribunals such as the European Court of 
Justice, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, and various international criminal 
and human rights courts issue binding judgments without asking the consent of national courts or 
governments. Transnational corporations, civil society organizations, public-private partnerships, 
and other non-state entities enter into agreements and build institutions that affect the lives of 
people within many countries. As no formal hierarchy or other constitutional ordering binds 
states and non-state actors, they freely engage with one another across national lines, often 
disregarding the jurisdiction of existing international regimes, to cooperate on matters of 
common or overlapping interest. The result is deep pluralism: the profusion within many 
domains of international organizations with partially complementary, but also partially 
competing purposes, representing differing values and accountable to distinct sets of authorizing 




This global pluralism is also rapidly diversifying its forms. Even as they proliferate, 
international organizations link with each other, and with firms, NGOs, and other civil society 
actors in novel and rapidly changing ways. These linkages can lead international organizations to 
accommodate their differences and involve civil society actors in agenda setting and 
implementation of agreements more systematically than before. One result is that novel forms of 
regulation are developing alongside more traditional forms of international law. 
  
We argue in this paper that the concept of Experimentalist Governance, hitherto 
presented largely within domestic U.S. legal scholarship and European Union studies literature,1 
can enhance our understanding of global pluralist governance in both law and political science.2 
Experimentalist Governance3 describes practices that operate within a broadly pluralist structure 
                                                 
* Florence Ellinwood Allen Professor of Law, New York University Law School.   
** Professor of International Affairs, Princeton University 
*** Maurice T. Moore Professor of Law and Social Science, Columbia Law School. 
We are grateful to Alison Zureick for excellent research assistance, to the participants at the December 2012 
workshop of the Straus Institute for the Advanced Study of Law and Justice at NYU for their comments and 
feedback, and to the editors and reviewers at the NYU Journal of International Law and Politics for their comments 
and help. 
 
1  See e.g . Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds),  Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart 
Publishing, 2004), Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds), Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: 
Towards a New Architecture (OUP, 2010) and the collections of essays in these two volumes.  On experimentalism 
in the US see e.g.  Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, “A Constitution of Experimentalist Governance” Columbia Law 
Review Vol 98 (1998) 267, Charles Sabel and William Simon “Minimalism and Experimentalism in American 
Public Law Georgetown Law Review Vol. 100 (2011) 53.   
 
2  On pluralism in global and European governance, see Paul Berman, “Global Legal Pluralism”, 80 Southern 
California Review 1155 (2007),  and “A Pluralist Approach to International Law”, 32 Yale Journal of International 
Law 301 (2007); William Burke-White, “International Legal Pluralism”  25 Mich. J. Int’l Law 963 (2004); Neil 
Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 Modern Law Review 317 (2002); Julio Baquero, The Legacy of 
the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement, 14 European Law Journal 389 (2008).  On legal pluralism more 
generally see Sally E. Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988). 
 
3 The concept of Experimentalist Governance will be defined and clarified more fully below in section I. 3 of this 
article.   Some of the differences and commonalities between the literature on ‘new governance’ in Europe, and the 
literature on experimentalist governance are discussed in G. de Búrca “New Governance and Experimentalism: An 
Introduction”, (2010) Wisconsin Law Review 101-112, and in the other essays contained in the same symposium 
issue, New Governance and the Transformation of Law, 2010 Wisconsin Law Review No. 2, edited by David and 
Louise Trubek.   For a useful discussion of the debates on the meaning of ‘new governance’ in the EU, see Adrienne 
Héritier and Dirk Lehmkuhl “The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance” Vol 28 (2008) Journal of 
Public Policy 1-17, and Kenneth Armstrong “The Character of EU Law and Governance:  From ‘Community 




of politics and law4 consistent with the broad framework of complex interdependence developed 
35 years ago in Power and Interdependence.5 In the terms used in Power and Interdependence, 
state and non-state actors are both sensitive and vulnerable to the actions of others: there is 
mutual dependence, although it may be asymmetrical. There are multiple state and non-state 
actors, linked by multiple channels of contact. Direct force is not a usable instrument of power. 
There is no overarching international constitutional framework with institutionalized hierarchical 
relations between governance units or courts. There are areas of agreed authority, but on many 
issues authority is overlapping, contested and fluid; and there is no necessary teleological 
movement toward greater integration or formal constitutionalization. The concept of 
Experimentalist Governance helps us to understand one particular – and, we suggest, 
increasingly prevalent - set of ways in which complex interdependence has become 
institutionalized to cope with problems of uncertainty in which continued discord is widely 
perceived as costly to all participants. Experimentalist Governance represents a form of adaptive, 
open-ended, participatory, and information-rich cooperation in world politics, in which the local 
and the transnational interact through the localized elaboration and adaption of transnationally 
agreed general norms, subject to periodic revision in light of knowledge locally generated.  
   
Experimentalist Governance as we present it is an “ideal type” in the sense used by Max 
Weber.6 Actual instances of governance may approximate to the ideal type even while none of 
them fully exemplifies it. Other governance practices occurring within the context of more 
conventional integrated international regimes, or in the relations between two more conventional 
international regimes, may also partake of some of the important elements of Experimentalist 
Governance even without including all of the elements we identify as necessary below. Peer 
review systems within the OECD, treaty-body monitoring within the UN human rights system, 
and transnational certification of environmental standards all have affinities to the fully-fledged 
Experimentalist Governance system embodying all five characteristics specified below. As the 
                                                 
4 Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (OUP, 2010) 
 
5 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1977; third edition, New York: Harper Collins, 2001).  
 
6  Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 1 (Gunther Ross and Claus Wittich (eds), University 
of California Press, 1978, translation), pp 19-22. 
5 
 
examples we discuss in this paper the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Montreal Protocol illustrate, 
forms of Experimentalist Governance are already evident in various arenas of global governance. 
We elaborate the idea of Experimentalist Governance and place it in relation to what we call 
“Modes One and Two”, which are characterized respectively by comprehensive and integrated 
international relations on the one hand, and the proliferation of regime complexes and 
governance networks on the other. Though we consider a number of explanatory and normative 
issues, this paper aspires more to raise questions than to provide definitive answers.  
 
A key feature of contemporary world politics that contributes to the growing difficulty of 
constructing comprehensive, integrated (Mode One) regimes is the increased diversity of 
interests and preferences among states whose consent is required for the operation of meaningful 
international regimes. Rapid economic growth in formerly poor countries has diffused power: the 
rich states of Europe, East Asia, and North America can no longer impose their will on others. 
On a variety of issues ranging from trade to intellectual property protection and to climate 
change, developing countries have markedly different preferences from those of industrialized 
countries. We argue that this increasing diversity of preferences has played an important role in 
the shift in international governance regimes from Mode One to Mode Two, and that increasing 
uncertainty provides incentives for the development of Experimentalist Governance (Mode 
Three).  
 
We also make some tentative normative observations. It may be too early in some cases 
to tell whether the instances of Experimentalist Governance operating in various global domains 
are functioning well and adequately addressing the global problems they were established to 
tackle. While their distinctive participatory, deliberative, locally-informed, and adaptive problem 
solving is normatively attractive, human institutions are easily distorted or corrupted; and 
unintended consequences are common. But we believe that Experimentalist Governance has the 
potential under appropriate conditions to be a constructive development, establishing 
relationships of legitimate authority by keeping the circle of decision making open to new 
participants, stabilizing expectations and generating possibilities for effective and satisfactory 
problem solving in a non-hierarchical fashion. We set out the positive case for Experimentalist 
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Governance in this paper without taking the position that all of its instances are likely to operate 
satisfactorily, or that the effects of any set of Experimentalist Governance practices will 
necessarily deliver positive results or be good in normative terms.  
 
I.  Three Modes of Governance 
 
Experimentalist Governance is a relatively new, indeed incipient form of transnational 
governance. To understand its significance, therefore, we must see it against the background of 
more established forms of global governance: the integrated international regimes of Mode One 
and the regime complexes and networks of Mode Two. Our use of the terms, “Mode One” and 
“Mode Two,” in contrast to Experimentalist Governance, which we present as “Mode Three,” 
may seem to suggest a sequence of development; but there is no implication either that 
Experimentalist Governance necessarily replaces Mode One or Mode Two Governance or even 
that it necessarily comes later in time. Indeed, two of our examples of Experimentalist 
Governance date originally from the 1980s; and more generally, Experimentalist Governance in 
some issue areas may be complementary to, rather than a substitute for, other modes of 
governance.  Nor do we argue that these three modes are equivalent or directly comparable. The 
most familiar of the three modes is likely to be the formally established Mode One international 
institutions and systems, while the evolutions we describe as Mode Two and Mode Three 
arrangements in many cases emerge from, build on, supplement or complement these traditional 
and coherent integrated regimes. Our category of Mode Two institutions on the other hand is 
broad, encompassing many kinds of networked arrangement and regime complexes, whereas our 
Mode Three category of Experimentalist Governance is narrower in scope and is also likely to be 
least familiar to readers. 
Mode One: Integrated International Regimes and Relations
 
The first mode of governance involves the creation of comprehensive and integrated 
international regimes. Attempts at creating such institutions were made in the years after World 
War I, but only came to fruition with the creation of the United Nations and its specialized 
agencies, along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and General 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), at the end of World War II. The Bretton Woods 
Monetary Regime (1958-1971) is a classic Mode One institution, dominated by states with clear 
rules for exchange rates and changes thereof.7 The other prototypical international regime was 
the GATT, which was later transformed into the World Trade Organization (WTO), but regimes 
were created also for oceans governance, air transport, food safety, and a wide variety of other 
issue areas.8  
 
Mode One international regimes can be reasonably well-characterized in terms of a 
principal-agent model: the leading nation-states or coalitions of states can be considered as 
principals who create international regimes to act as their agents in addressing and solving what 
are considered to be well defined governance problems arising from interdependence. The states 
believe that they understand the problems clearly and they define them in advance. Their 
resolution is delegated to the agents, the international organizations, to resolve according to 
specific rules that they are mandated to follow. 
 
The early Mode One institutions underwent both growth and crisis during the first forty 
years after World War II.9 They seemed to undergo a revival from the mid-1980s until the mid-
1990s, marked by the negotiations leading to the formal launch of the WTO on January 1, 1995, 
which was much more comprehensive and integrated than the earlier GATT launched in 1947. 
The Rio Conference in 1992, which established the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), exemplified the drive to establish new issue-specific international regimes, 
stimulating discussion of how such a climate regime would be linked to regimes for international 
trade, forestry, and transport.  
 
                                                 
7 R. Keohane and J. Nye 1977, n.5 above,  chs. 4-6. 
 
8 Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).  This book was 
previously a special issue of the journal, International Organization (volume 35:2, spring 1982).  
 
9 See e.g. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 




The construction of integrated and comprehensive international regimes is at the heart of 
what we call Mode One. International regimes are devised in order to provide governance for 
areas of increased interdependence, facilitating coordination by reducing the costs of making and 
enforcing agreement and generating information about current and likely future actions.10 These 
formal rules are rarely determinative: on the contrary, powerful states can use the threat of exit to 
secure acquiescence by others to actions that they take, contrary to the formal rules, to pursue 
their own interests on issues important to them.11 But for most states almost all of the time and 
for powerful states most of the time, the formal rules shape feasible actions. As we will see, 
however, over time and in certain contexts, the extension by these international organizations of 
their mandates and the expansion of their powers beyond what could plausibly be accommodated 
within a principal-agent model of accountability have led to the emergence of novel forms of 
governance and administrative law.  
 
The largely state-centric nature of these international regimes does not imply that they 
can be understood purely by focusing on states as units. The domestic politics of powerful states 
must also be understood – in a transnational context – if we are to understand the formation and 
evolution of international regimes.12 States, furthermore, are not necessarily united; different 
sub-units of the same state may well have different interests with respect to particular issues, and 
may develop political strategies entailing active participation in transgovernmental coalitions and 
networks involving sub-units of other governments, sometimes in opposition to 
transgovernmental networks that include different sub-units of the same government.13  
 
                                                 
10 R. Keohane, n. 9 above,  chapters 4-6.  
11 Randall Stone, Informal Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
 
12 Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization 41 
(1987): 491-517; Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International 
Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Andrew Moravcsik, “A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics,” International Organization 51 (1997): 513-554. 
 
13 Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” 
World Politics 27 (1974): 39-62; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 




 Looking back, it is easy to see the political conditions that facilitated the establishment 
of coherent international regimes, both in the immediate post-World War II period and just after 
the Cold War ended: namely the concentration of power either in one state or a small number of 
states with similar interests. Between 1944, when the World Bank and IMF were created at 
Bretton Woods, and 1973, when the first oil crisis shook the confidence of the West, the United 
States had such dominance among western democracies that it could exercise what has been 
called “hegemonic leadership.”14 Hegemonic leadership did not mean that the United States 
dictated terms – on the contrary, it often had to revise its initial plans and make concessions to 
accommodate other states – but it did mean that it set the agenda and that nothing substantial 
could be agreed without its consent. The United States was clearly the most influential actor in 
creating institutions such as NATO, the GATT, the World Bank, and the IMF and in shaping 
their practices. The United States’ enormous influence was even evident in areas without such 
institutions, such as the oil trade. 
 
 There was a post-hegemonic pause in integrated regime construction during the 1970s 
and 1980s, but this pause was followed by the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which began operations at the beginning of 1995. Creation of the WTO was possible because, 
before the rapid economic growth of large developing countries such as China, India and Brazil, 
the global political economy was dominated by the United States and the European Community, 
as the EU then was called. It took these two entities eight years to agree on the terms of the 
WTO, but when they had done so, they compelled other states’ acceptance by the simple 
expedient of formally abolishing the GATT and requiring other states to accept WTO rules or be 
placed under restrictive 1930s tariff disciplines.15 
 
By the end of the 1990s, the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the expansion and 
increasing institutionalization of the European Community had made Europe a more coherent 
and independent actor in world politics. During the 1990s, the European Community, now the 
                                                 
14 Keohane 1984, especially chapter 3. 
 
15 Richard Steinberg, “In the Shadow of Law or Power: Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the 




European Union, had begun to conclude major international treaties – notably the Land Mines 
Treaty and the Rome Statute establishing an International Criminal Court. Human rights 
agreements such as the Convention on Torture and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
were also instituted and strengthened during this period, gaining almost universal membership.16 
There seemed to be hope for the further institutionalization of international regimes – following 
the pattern in trade – and for building systematic connections among them. However, as we will 
see, it was not long before this architectonic view of global governance through coherent 
institutions ceased to be plausible. 
  
Mode Two: Regime Complexes and Orchestrated Networks 
 
From the mid-1990s on, patterns of institutionalization changed. Newly constructed 
international regimes less often received universal support: for instance, the Land Mines Treaty 
and the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court were pushed to fruition 
largely by European states, without support from the United States. Efforts to make new rules for 
international trade under the auspices of the WTO collapsed; a sustained effort to build a 
comprehensive climate change regime, manifested by the creation of the UN Framework 
Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) at Rio in 1992, also failed. The first indication of 
this failure came with the Berlin Mandate in 1995, which exempted developing countries from 
requirements to limit their emissions of greenhouse gases; later, the United States refused to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol and Canada, having ratified, failed to comply with the emissions limits 
that it had accepted. In some cases counter-regimes were established as alternatives to, and 
platforms from which to influence the development of existing international organizations. The 
Biosafety Protocol, for example was agreed by international environmental NGOs, several 
European states, and some developing countries to establish the legitimacy of “precautionary” 
regulation of genetically modified organisms, as a counterweight to WTO rules then presumed to 
allow for restrictions in the trade of a product only when scientific analysis conclusively 
demonstrated that it is hazardous.17 
                                                 
16 Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  





The period after 1995  therefore witnessed the stagnation or collapse of attempts to 
develop new comprehensive and integrated international regimes, the fragmentation of 
established ones, and occasional overt challenges to their authority. This period also featured a 
departure from hierarchy as a structuring principle of international organizations, and the spread, 
in its place, of novel forms of networked information exchange.  This “new world order,” as 
Anne-Marie Slaughter has described it, is best depicted as a set of networks among independent 
and interdependent entities – not just states but sub-units of states and non-state actors.18 In a 
global society linked by the internet and the social media derived from it, the connections
between entities rather than the entities or organizations themselves are transforming 
relationships in world politics. For example, entities now often have authority because other 
actors regard them as legitimate rule-makers and therefore defer to them. Jessica Green has 
developed the concept of “entrepreneurial authority” to refer to the construction of authority by 
civil society actors without formal authorization by or delegation from states.19 One prominent 
instance of entrepreneurial authority is the Forest Stewardship Council, which was established by 
civil society organizations after the failure of inter-state negotiations made it clear that there 
would be no comprehensive forestry regime.20The FSC does not have authority over states, but 
its rules are influential and are followed particularly by firms that seek certification as pursuing 
sustainable forestry practices.  
Some emergent authorities are “orchestrated”, in the sense that they are supported and 
coordinated by existing (often Mode One) international organizations, seeking to extend 
governance beyond the point of state agreement or to deepen the application of rules by 
involving other organizations and actors in their construction.21 One increasingly common form 
                                                 
18 A.M. Slaughter 2004, n.13 above. 
 
19 Jessica Green, Private Actors, Public Goods:  Private Authority in Global Environmental Politics (PhD 
dissertation, Princeton University, 2010); J. Green, “Order out of Chaos:  Public and Private Rules for Managing 
Carbon,” forthcoming, Global Environmental Politics.  
20 www.fsc.org.  For criticism see www.fsc-watch.org. 
 
21 Kenneth N. Abbott, “Public-Private Sustainability Governance,” International Affairs 88 (2012): 543-564; 
Kenneth N. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “International Regulation without International Government: Improving 





of authority, whether orchestrated by multilateral institutions or originating in entrepreneurship 
by civil society organizations, is the institution of public-private partnerships.And indeed, since 
the 1990s public-private partnerships have proliferated and international organizations have 
increasingly orchestrated new forms of authority involving non-state actors.22 
 
The inertia of established institutions was a precondition for much of this innovation. 
International regimes are difficult to change: changing rules generates losers as well as winners, 
and binding majority voting is rare. So, even as social and political circumstances change, often 
at a rapid rate, regimes neither disappear nor are radically reformed. Instead, their rules persist 
but—leaving aside happy accidents when old routines serve new environments—they become 
increasingly obsolete. This process generates significant gaps between the capabilities of existing 
institutions and the demands for collective action of some member states or of transnational or 
transgovernmental coalitions. In our heuristic model Mode Two, institutions respond to this gap. 
Formerly coherent international regimes are unable, when state preferences are diverse, to cope 
with rapid changes. The result may be the formation of other institutional arrangements not 
tightly linked to existing regimes, or deadlock, if states are unable to agree on a unified set of 
rules and practices. 
 
Institutional inertia and the dispersion of power and interests have thus led to the 
emergence of a variety of governance arrangements, including regime complexes and various 
internationally ‘orchestrated’ governance arrangements.23 A regime complex has been defined in 
the pioneering article on the subject as “an array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical 
institutions governing a particular issue area.”24 Regime complexes have been identified in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
22 Liliana Andonova, “Public-Private Partnerships for the Earth: Politics and Patterns of Hybrid Authority in the 
Multilateral System,” Global Environmental Politics 10 (2010): 24-53.  
 
23 Kenneth W. Abbott, P. Genschel, D. Snidal, and B. Zangl, “International Organizations as Orchestrators,” 
unpublished paper presented at the 2011 International Studies Association meeting, Montreal.  
 
24 Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor, “The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources,” International 




areas of climate change, energy, intellectual property, and anti-corruption.25 Further, one could 
interpret the partial fragmentation of trade arrangements, with the proliferation of bilateral and 
regional deals, and the fragmentation of monetary arrangements, as indicating that regime 
complexes characterize these issue areas as well. We observe that regime complexes, involving 
various institutions (often including states, sub-state units, international organizations, civil 
society organizations, private actors and others) many of which are linked non-hierarchically to 
one another, have increasingly replaced more tightly integrated (Mode One) international 
regimes. 
 
The interstate climate change regime, in Figure 1, illustrates one instance of what we are 
calling Mode Two institutions. For a more complete picture, private actors should also be 
included.  The circle is intended to indicate the institutions, clubs, or networks that are focused 
most directly on issues of climate change.  
                                                 
25 Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier, “The Politics of International Regime Complexity: Symposium,” Perspectives
on Politics 7 (2009): 13-24; Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, “The Regime Complex for Climate Change,” 
Perspectives on Politics 9 (2011):  7-23; Jeff D. Colgan, Robert O. Keohane, and Thijs van d Graaf, “Punctuated 
Equilibrium in the Energy Regime Complex,” Review of International Organizations 7 (2012): 117-143;  Laurence 
R. Helfer “Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property 
Lawmaking” Yale Journal of International law 29 (2004) 1 and Kevin Davis "Does the Globalization of Anti-





Figure 1.  The Regime Complex for Climate Change. . Source: Robert O. Keohane and David 
G. Victor, “The Regime Complex for Climate Change,” Perspectives on Politics 9 (2011):  7-23
 
 
Our Mode Two category therefore includes regime complexes (some of whose 
components may pursue divergent interests), as well as networks and other novel institutions that 
arise from entrepreneurial authority, or from non-hierarchical arrangements that are orchestrated 
by existing international organizations. These institutions are networked and involve connections 
between independent entities. They have little in common with the integrated regimes of Mode 
One, answering to sovereign states. 
Some semblance of continuity and normalcy is however maintained by the diffusion in 
Mode Two institutions of various forms of what has been termed “Global Administrative 
15 
 
Law,”26 a bundle of principles, rules and practices derived from or analogous to principles of 
domestic administrative law, including due process, proportionality, judicial review and 
transparency. The spread of such principles and practices reflects a broadly shared concern to 
protect the values of the rule of law associated with the democratic nation state, especially by 
means of the procedural devices commonly used to induce domestic administrators to “listen” to 
the objections of those subject to their decisions and generally to remain faithful to the statutory 
mandates authorizing their action. But as Nico Krisch, one of those scholars who initially called 
attention to the significance of Global Administrative Law, has observed, these safeguards 
presuppose the existence of a unitary (democratic) sovereign or legislator; their utility as 
instruments of oversight depends in substantial measure on the backstop of elections in which 
citizens hold their representatives accountable for the way they call administrators to account. 
There is of course no unitary sovereign, much less an electoral backstop in the pluralist settings 
of global governance. Global Administrative Law may thus under some circumstances make 
international organizations responsive enough to diverse stakeholders to ensure their legitimacy; 
but its overall effectiveness as a safeguard of the rule of law is open to question, at least to the 
extent that it hews in practice to the domestic administrative law that inspired it.27 
But in an increasingly wide range of cases, international organizations, to be effective 
and legitimate, are going beyond the accommodations of Mode Two and the procedural 
protections of traditional administrative law, and adopting organizational forms that allow state 
and non-state actors to learn, accountably, from their different perspectives how to respond to 
problems that none understands sufficiently to address alone. 
 
Mode Three: Experimentalist Governance 
 
Since the distinctive feature of this article is its focus on Experimentalist Governance, we 
need to be quite specific about what we mean by this term.  Experimentalist Governance 
                                                 
26 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law,” Law and 
Contemporary Problems, vol., 68, nos. 3 & 4 (2005).  For the extensive literature that has grown up around this 
school of thought, see http://www.iilj.org/GAL/. 
 





describes a set of practices involving open participation by a variety of entities (public or 
private), lack of formal hierarchy within governance arrangements, and extensive deliberation 
throughout the process of decision making and implementation. The ideal-type of deliberation 
within an Experimentalist Governance regime entails initial reflection and discussion based on a 
broadly shared perception of a common problem, resulting in the articulation of a framework 
understanding with open-ended goals. Implementation of these broadly framed goals is then left 
to lower-level actors with knowledge of local conditions and considerable discretion to adapt the 
framework norms to these different contexts. There is continuous feedback from local contexts, 
reporting and monitoring across a range of contexts. Outcomes are subject to peer review, and 
goals and practices are periodically and routinely evaluated and reconsidered in light of the data 
gathered, the results of the peer review, and the shared purposes. Experimentalist Governance 
regimes frequently operate in the shadow of a background “penalty default” that penalizes non-
cooperation, typically by substantially reducing the parties’ control over their fate, and thus 
inducing re-evaluation of the relative benefits of joint efforts.  
 
Consequently, five crucial identifying features of Experimentalist Governance are as 
follows: 
1) Openness to participation of relevant entities (‘stakeholders’) in a non-
hierarchical process of decision making;  
2) Articulation of a broadly agreed common problem and the establishment of a 
framework understanding setting open-ended goals; 
3) Implementation by lower-level actors with local or contextualized knowledge;  
4) Continuous feedback, reporting, and monitoring; 
5) Established practices, involving peer review, for revising rules and practices. 
 
 
As we have noted above, various new governance arrangements, including several of the 
pluralist governance systems we have categorized as Mode Two, meet many of our criteria for 
Experimentalist Governance. For example, transgovernmental networks and public-private 
partnerships such as the Forest Stewardship Council are typically non-hierarchical, open to fairly 
wide participation; they also provide for the local implementation and adaptation of 
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transnationally agreed framework goals.28 But only arrangements that meet all five of the criteria 
that we have specified constitute Experimentalist Governance in our sense. The concept of 
Experimentalist Governance is therefore more demanding than the broader category of pluralistic 
governance processes outlined in Mode Two. We emphasize, however, contrary to some 
descriptions of ‘new governance’ systems, that binding legal obligations or sanctions for certain 
aspects of non-performance are not necessarily incompatible with an Experimentalist 
Governance regime. 
 
 Mode Three or Experimentalist regimes regularize and officialize many of the practices 
that Mode Two institutions undertake sporadically. Like Mode Two institutions, experimentalist 
institutions connect a wide range of state and non-state actors in non-hierarchical configurations 
that are not simply an informal adjunct or complement to the closed and rule-based regimes of 
Mode One. But whereas Mode Two gap-filling efforts may be thought of as ad hoc responses to 
unusual circumstances, the Experimentalist institutions that we describe as Mode Three are 
premised on the understanding that uncertainty is a persistent feature of some issue areas and that 
to respond effectively, institutions must enable participants to learn continuously to redefine the 
problems they face in the very process of solving them. 
 
Such experimentalist arrangements institutionalize the kind of consultation and 
associated exercise of discretion that, when exercised informally, are characteristic of 
transgovernmental networks. Peer review in the ideal-type of Experimentalist institutions is not, 
however, as in many transgovernmental networks, merely a matter of occasional exchange of 
views among colleagues, part information-gathering, part coalition-building. Rather it is a 
mechanism both for learning systematically from diverse experience—diverse because each 
“local” actor is interpreting the general problem and corresponding solutions in a particular 
context—and for holding actors accountable in the sense of determining whether their 
interpretations and solutions are compelling or at a minimum defensible given the reactions of 
peers in similar circumstances. 
                                                 
28 For a discussion of the Forest Stewardship Council’s experimentalist features see Christine Overdevest and 
Jonathan Zeitlin. “Assembling an Experimentalist Regime: Transnational Governance Interactions in the Forest 




Similarly, experimentalist institutions should, ideally, regularize the kinds of 
organizational innovation undertaken by Mode Two entrepreneurs and orchestrators. A common 
feature of Mode Two governance arrangements is that some subset of an existing organization or 
regime with jurisdiction in a domain tries to extend its problem solving capacity either by 
creating a novel institution or expanding its jurisdiction. Extending problem solving capacity 
may involve creating  a public-private partnership,—to inform and so augment the capabilities of 
the incumbents.  Expanding jurisdiction may involve creating new, competing organizational 
actors with a novel understanding of the domain, its problems, and possible remedies. The role of 
the entrepreneurial or orchestrating institutions is thus to instigate, from time to time, in the face 
of persistently unmet needs, the exploration of institutional possibilities in the domain, and, 
where advisable, to encourage the creation of new organizations. 
 
But this kind of occasional or ad hoc practice within Mode Two arrangements is, in 
effect, what the guiding entities within an experimentalist system – constituting the “center” of 
such a system – should routinely do. Because the overarching purposes of Experimentalist 
Governance institutions are cast as a general framework, and local units are authorized or 
obligated to contextualize these purposes in applying generally agreed norms and practices to 
local contexts. Implementation of the institution’s goals will frequently involve exploration of 
unforeseen particulars, the discovery both of local dead ends and of novel, generalizable 
solutions, some of which may indeed raise questions about the originally agreed framework’s 
goals and ends. In organizing periodic, peer review of local results, the central nodes of an 
Experimentalist Governance system bring such findings to light, and then have responsibility for 
instigating the organizational reforms that they suggest. In this sense Experimentalist institutions 
should routinely orchestrate their own reform. 
 
Put another way, the emergence of experimentalist institutions completes and makes 
manifest a break with familiar forms of principal-agent accountability. Mode One fits clearly 
within a principal-agent model: Powerful states—the principals—create international regimes—
the agents—to solve well defined governance problems arising from interdependence. The 
regimes are rule-based. Even though the rules officially afford agents some administrative 
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discretion and informal consultation affords them further room for maneuver at the margins of 
the officially permissible, in the end there is a set of actors (“principals” in this literature) 
authorized to monitor agents’ behavior and impose sanctions when this behavior deviates from 
prescribed rules.29 
 
In Mode Two, the fragmentation of authority means that no single set of principals 
(whether states or others) is able in a comprehensive way to sanction behavior by agents. In the 
regime complex for climate change, for instance, there are sharp differences over which states 
should bear responsibility for limiting emissions of greenhouse gasses; the principals are divided 
in ways that prevent coherent principal-agent relationships from developing. The creation of 
public-private partnerships is similarly a joint confession by both parties that each is incapable of 
acting unilaterally: neither can issue instructions except in consultation with the other. These 
breaches of the strict principal-agent relationship may be inconspicuous but they are nonetheless 
significant.  
Going beyond this point, Experimentalist institutions as we will see below routinize 
patterns of accountability that are different from those underpinning the standard principal-agent 
model. Uncertainty is increasingly important. Mutual monitoring and peer review, involving 
elaborate processes of consultation that is horizontal rather than vertical in structure replace 
established hierarchical authority as the basis for accountability.  
  
Another way to think about our typology of three modes of governance is to envisage 
them as arrayed on two dimensions of variation. The first captures the degree of rule coherence. 
Mode One institutions cluster at the coherent pole of this axis: They aim to be consistent with 
one another and as comprehensive or all-inclusive in their domain as possible. Mode Two 
institutions cluster at the incoherent pole: They make no pretense of regulating their entire 
domain and accept that the rules they make may conflict with those made by other institutions 
operating in the same mode. 30 The second dimension captures the actors’ beliefs regarding the 
                                                 
29 Grant and Keohane, “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics,” APSR February 
2005. 
30 On rule coherence see Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations  (OUP, 
1990), chapters 10 and 11. 
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degree of uncertainty they face: whether they have sufficient knowledge of the issue area to have 
clearly defined preferences over policies rather than simply over outcomes. Mode One actors 
cluster at the low-uncertainty pole, reasonably confident in their ability to establish workable 
policies ex ante, on the basis of current knowledge. Less confident, Mode Two actors will 
occupy the middle range, while Experimentalist actors, aware of the uncertainty they face, 
collect at the opposite extreme.  Figure 2 illustrates this point.  
  








high Mode One   
low  Mode Two Mode Three 
 





The Experimentalist actors know broadly what outcomes they desire – such as a cleaner 
environment, protection of dolphins and sustainable tuna fishery, or arrangements that include 
and empower disabled people while respecting their autonomy; but initially they are uncertain 
about how to obtain these objectives. This difference is reflected in a fundamental difference in 
the understanding of what rules are. Mode One and sometimes Mode Two institutions aim to fix 
precise, binding and definitive rules to give effect to their policy preferences. Experimentalist 
institutions, aware of current and perhaps persistent limits on their foresight, set provisional 
goals and establish procedures for periodically revising them on the basis of peer review of the 
diverse experience of the actors attempting to realize them. Because Experimentalist institutions 
encourage local autonomy and contextual responses to diverse situations, they will tend towards 
the “incoherent” pole of the integration-fragmentation dimension; but this diversity, in addition 
to accommodating the particulars of local circumstance, serves broad, joint exploration of 
possibility. It is not a sign of clashing, irreducibly plural understandings of the world. As another 
way of schematically summarizing this discussion, we present Table 1, which succinctly defines 
21 
 
each Mode of Governance, indicates the major period in which such entities have been created 
(without implying a strict time demarcation or a linear progression), and provides three 
prominent examples of each Mode. 
 
 
Governance mode: Definition: Major periods: Examples: 
One.  Comprehensive, 
integrated 
international regimes 
1945- Bretton Woods 
Monetary System, Air 
Transport Regime, 
WTO. 
         Two.  Regime complexes: 
multiple, non-
hierarchical sets of 
institutions 
1995- Regime Complex for 
Climate Change,  
Public-private health 
regime complex 







Convention on the 
Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, 
Montreal Protocol on 
Substances Depleting 
the Ozone Layer 
 
Table 1.  Three Modes of Governance 
 
To illustrate how Experimentalist Governance works in practice, we now discuss three 
examples of this mode of governance: the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
Depleting the Ozone Layer.  
II. Experimentalist Governance in Action: The Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission as an Experimentalist Regime
  
The purpose of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) is to maintain 
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tuna stocks in the Eastern Tropical Pacific while minimizing the death of dolphin by-catch.31 Its 
origins and organization exemplify the characteristically experimentalist co-development of 
organizational structure, problem definition and solutions (and the changes in the parties’ 
understanding of their interests and objects which all this supposes) under the continuing 
influence of background penalty defaults in the form of draconian trade sanctions.32  
 
The regulatory problem arose because in the Eastern Tropical Pacific herds of dolphins 
accompany schools of tuna swimming below them. Starting in the late 1950s large fishing 
vessels began to use the dolphin herds, easily visible on the surface, to locate tuna in 
international waters, and then encircle the school with huge purse seine nets which draw shut at 
the bottom—a technique known as dolphin sets. Dolphins do not abandon the tuna and, absent 
precautions, drown when the fish are hauled aboard.  
 
Public concern about dolphin mortality contributed to pressure in Congress for passage of 
the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) in 1972. This legislation obligated the U.S. tuna 
fishing fleet to reduce serious harm to dolphins to “insignificant levels approaching a zero 
rate.”33 The legislation also required placement of observers on board vessels to ensure 
compliance with equipment and practice requirements, and with fleet-wide mortality limits.34 
The Act additionally banned imports of tuna catch that involved “incidental kill or incidental 
serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of United States standards.”35 
 
As part of its efforts to enforce implementation of the MMPA internationally, the 
National Marine Fisheries Service, an agency of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
                                                 
31 See http://www.iattc.org/HomeENG.htm 
 
32 This case study draws significantly on the account of Richard Parker, “The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to 
Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict” Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 12 (1999) 1. 
 
33 Marine Mammal Protection Act (1972), Section 101 (a) (2). 
 
34 Ibid, Section 114(e). 
 
35 Ibid, Section 101(a) (2). 
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Administration, in consultation with the Department of State, sought the collaboration of the 
IATTC. The IATTC was founded as an intergovernmental fisheries management commission by 
coastal states in 1948 and had, in the mid-1970s long-standing relations to the key actors in the 
industry. But the IATTC also had the familiar, tragedy-of-the-commons problems of deep-sea 
fisheries, where, in the absence of property rights each user has an incentive to exploit the 
resource before others do, with overfishing as the result. This combination of capacities and 
debilities (exacerbated by the need for external support in enforcing quotas) made the IATTC the 
forum of choice for the U.S. dolphin protection initiative. Beginning in 1976 it organized 
programs to place observers on tuna vessels (at the IATTC’s expense, and initially without 
enforcement powers). The observers were to collect data on fishing techniques and dolphin 
mortality, estimate trends in dolphin populations, investigate possibilities for reducing mortality, 
and disseminate information regarding best practices with dolphin sets to vessel captains and 
crews. But participation in the crucial observer operations remained minimal until the MMPA 
was amended in 1984 to require exporters to demonstrate compliance with a regulatory system 
“comparable” to that in the United States, a requirement that the Fisheries Service determined 
would be automatically met by participation in IATTC observer program. 
  
Broad participation in the observer program produced a flood of information that 
reshaped existing understandings of both the problem and the solution. From 1985 and 1986, the 
first year of reliable observation, the estimate of dolphin mortality caused by the non-U.S. fleet 
increased from 40,000 to 112,000 dolphins. It was also discovered that dolphin mortality could 
be very significantly reduced by using simple technologies for releasing dolphins from closing 
nets, and by avoiding certain bad practices, such as setting nets on unusually large herds of tuna 
or dolphin, in new areas, beginning at sundown and continuing into the dark, in the presence of 
strong sub-surface currents, or with faulty gear.36 In the years following these discoveries the 
IATTC systematically interviewed the fishers to learn what techniques did and did not work, and 
diffused this information to the fleet in workshops, thus becoming “a fleet-wide clearinghouse of 
information on dolphin mortality reduction gear, techniques, and experience.”37 
                                                 
36 R. Parker, n. above, 1 at 28. 
 




But promising new practices were not implemented until there was a credible threat of a 
penalty default, once more in the form of trade sanctions. Public awareness of the disparities in 
mortality rates between the U.S. and foreign fleets let to further 1988 amendments of the MMPA 
that placed on embargo on imports of Eastern Tropical Pacific tuna from any country without a 
precisely defined regulatory program closely keyed to the latest U.S. practice and a kill rate 
“comparable” to that of the U.S. fleet.38 Thus qualifying regulatory programs had to, for 
example, prohibit “sundown sets,” as did U.S. law; foreign fleet kill rates, after a one-year grace 
period, could not exceed the U.S. rate by more than 25 percent; and observers had to accompany 
all foreign as well as U.S. vessels. After passage of the amendment there was a dramatic increase 
in the frequency of IATTC dolphin mortality reduction seminars and the number of attendees.39 
 
This process of both ensuring compliance with the existing program and learning to 
improve mortality-reducing practices by monitoring the actions of individual vessels and 
systematically disseminating the findings was codified in the 1992 La Jolla Agreement signed by 
Mexico, Venezuela, the United States, and other coastal flag states, with the support of many 
NGOs.40 The Agreement committed signatories to an International Dolphin Conservation 
Program that would progressively reduce dolphin mortality in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. Overall 
dolphin mortality in the fishery was to be capped by 1999 at less than 5,000, with each “qualified 
vessel” allocated a pro rata share of the total. Every vessel capable of deploying dolphin sets 
must carry an observer to monitor dolphin mortality, and half the observers must be nominated 
by the IATTC. The Agreement also creates an Implementation Review Panel composed of 
IATTC staff, six delegates from signatory states, two representatives each from industry and 
NGOs. The 1992 La Jolla Agreement was officially non-binding, but all signatories have 
complied with it, and data show that there has been a reduction of mortality rates to levels below 
the best previously achieved by the U.S. fleet. Despite U.S. Congressional legislation to ban 
                                                 
38 Ibid, at p.30. 
 
39 Ibid, at p.32, fn 130. 
 




imports of tuna caught using dolphin sets, the La Jolla Agreement survived as fleets based 
primarily in Mexico and Venezuela, sold their catch to Latin American and EU markets whose 
consumers are environmentally conscious but not insistent on complete protection of dolphins.41 
 
The IATTC regime exhibits the five features that define experimentalist regimes. Though 
the regime was created at the instigation of the United States, participation was open to those 
who identified themselves as relevant stakeholders: NGOs (some of which played a crucial role 
in achieving the La Jolla Agreement), fleet owners and crews, and flag states.  The initial goals 
of the regime—preservation of Eastern Tropical Pacific tuna stocks and protection of dolphins—
were broad and open ended (no one had precise ideas of how to accomplish either) and their 
relation to one another unknown. Methods for achieving these goals, and a clarification of the 
trade-offs involved in their pursuit, were only established by continuous monitoring and 
reporting of implementation of best current practices by lower-level actors—the on-board 
observers. That is, decision making was not hierarchical: it responded more to local experience 
than to the prior preferences of major states. Indeed, the La Jolla Agreement was negotiated to 
institutionalize the regime without relying on the support of the U.S. review of local 
implementation, and the elaboration of proposals for improvement were organized by the 
IATTC. As a result of this continuous monitoring, emerging rules and practices were subject to 
revision through processes of peer review. The interplay of on-board observation and concerted 
evaluation of results by the IATTC was indispensible to defining the scope of the problem, in 
identifying a general approach to a solution, and improving the techniques for implementing it.  
                                                 
41The success of the La Jolla Agreement is all the more striking because in the years immediately preceding it (and 
following the discovery of the high mortality rate of foreign fleets), Earth Island, a U.S.-based NGO, had 
campaigned successfully among canners and in Congress for complete protection of dolphins through an outright 
ban on tuna harvested by dolphin sets—only tuna caught by other techniques could be labeled “dolphin free” and 
imported into the U.S.  But, as had long been known, alternative fishing methods spared dolphin at the cost of 
ensnaring large numbers of juvenile tuna, thus reducing the reproductive capacity of the fishery and speeding 
depletion of stocks. The campaign divided the movement to regulate the fishery, with environmental groups 
including The World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace and The Environmental Defense Fund joining the IATTC in taking 
an “environmental” perspective that gave priority to defense of the whole ecosystem, while Earth Island and its 
allies in Congress (given a free hand by the migration of much of the US fleet to skipjack fisheries in the Western 
Pacific) made protection of dolphins their exclusive goal:  see R. Parker, ibid.  In recent proceedings brought before 
the Appellate Body by Mexico (which was compliant with the La Jolla agreement) against the U.S. in July 2012 
(Tuna II), the labeling requirement imposed by the US was found to be discriminatory and unjustified:  United 
States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, AB 2012-2, 




Yet these processes of Experimentalist Government were by no means purely consensual 
and free from the constraints and dynamics of power. On the contrary, penalty defaults, in the 
form of trade sanctions that threatened fleets from non-compliant countries with loss of the U.S. 
market for tropical tuna, were indispensible both to the creation of the monitoring regime and to 
the broad implementation of the measures it suggested. Indeed, the threat of trade sanctions to 
induce deliberative formation of regimes has become a common device for establishing 
Experimentalist international organizations. Experimentalist Governance in such circumstances 
clearly takes place within the shadow of power and against a backdrop of coercive alternatives.  
 
III. The Regime of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities as 
an Emergent Experimentalist regime 
Although the domain of human rights protection may at first sight appear an unlikely 
candidate for Experimentalist Governance,42 and many other human rights treaties do not operate 
in a particularly experimentalist way, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) includes many provisions characteristic of an experimentalist system.43 
Each of the five features of experimentalism we have outlined above is present in the 
architecture of the regime established in 2008 when the CRPD came into force.  
 
In some ways the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is similar to 
conventional international human rights treaties.  It sets broad goals (e.g. promoting and ensuring 
full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all disabled persons), 
and follows these with a series of eight overarching general principles: respect for dignity, full 
                                                 
42  See G.de Búrca, “EU Race Discrimination Law: A Hybrid Model”  in G. de Búrca and J. Scott Law and New 
Governance in Europe and the U.S. (Hart, 2006), and “New Modes of Governance and the Protection of Human 
Rights” in P. Alston and O. De Schutter (eds) Monitoring Fundamental Rights in the EU (Hart Publishing, 2005) 25. 
43 For an account of the EU’s role in the drafting of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its 
impact or otherwise on the experimentalist nature of the Convention, see G. de Búrca, “The EU in the Negotiation of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (2010) European Law Review Vol. 35, 174.  For a 
reading of the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) which shares many 
of the understandings of experimentalism, see Judith Resnik “Comparative (in)equalities: CEDAW, the jurisdiction 




participation and inclusion, non-discrimination, respect for difference, equal opportunity, 
accessibility, gender equality, and respect for the evolving capacities of children.44 These in turn 
are followed by an extensive series of positive and negative obligations on states to ensure the 
full realization of the rights of disabled persons.45 
 
However, a number of more unusual provisions and features of the CRPD add 
significantly to its experimentalist character.46 Examples of these novel provisions are: (i) the 
central role accorded to civil society organizations – in this case mainly disabled persons’ 
organizations (DPOs), other NGOs, and national human rights institutions (NHRIs) – in all 
aspects of the Convention’s drafting, implementation, decision making, monitoring, and 
operation; (ii) a specific provision requiring national implementation and monitoring, with a 
central role for national institutions, to complement the more traditional provisions on 
international monitoring; (iii) an obligation on states to collect relevant data; and (iv) a provision 
for the holding of a substantive annual conference of the parties. Other features of the CRPD also 
resonate with the premises of Experimentalist Governance, in particular the open-ended and 
flexible nature of many of its provisions.47 
 
 Recall the five key features of Experimentalist Governance as we have defined the term:  
                                                 
44  Articles 1 and 3 CRPD. 
 
45 Article 4 CRPD. 
 
46 For an analysis of the novelty of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities as a human rights 
instrument, F. Mégret “The Disabilities Convention: Towards a Holistic Conception of Rights” International Journal 
of Human Rights, Vol. 12, No. 261, 2008. 
 
47  On the relevance this flexibility, see T. Melish, “The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
Historic Process, Strong Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify, 14 Hum. Rts. Brief. 37 (2007):  “the 
Committee carefully avoided "shopping lists" and over-specification of details and standards as an agreed 
operational modality in the drafting process. It did so precisely to ensure that the Convention's text would remain 
relevant and vital over time and space, capable of responding to new challenges and modes of abuse as they arose, 
as well as the vastly different challenges faced by States at different levels of development. It also wished to avoid 
the negative inference that anything not expressly included in a detailed provision was intended to be excluded. 
Thus, broadly exemplary terms with inclusive references and a higher level of generality were consistently preferred 
to overly-specific, narrowly-tailored ones or "lists" of abuse and standardized implementing measures. The choice 
and design of precise implementing measures is properly left to the discretion of States, in consultation with civil 
society and informed by the processes of constructive dialogue and information sharing envisioned by the 
supervisory framework established under the Convention” 
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openness to participation of relevant entities; the establishment of a framework understanding 
setting open-ended goals; implementation by lower-level actors with local or contextualized 
knowledge; continuous feedback, reporting, and monitoring; and established practices, involving 
peer review, for revising rules and practices. All five of these Experimentalist features pertain to 
the CRPD.  
 
(a) “Open participation” 
The CRPD’s emphasis on ensuring the participation of persons with disabilities was not only 
evident in the negotiation and drafting of the Convention itself but also animates many of its 
substantive provisions.48 The impetus to ensure such inclusion of disabled persons derived in part 
from the growing influence of the social model of disability that emerged during the civil rights 
movement in the United States, was institutionalized in the Americans with Disabilities Act in 
1990, and gradually diffused internationally.49 The social model of disability contrasts with the 
more traditional medical model of disability, in emphasizing that the disadvantages which arise 
from the variation in the physical, mental, and emotional characteristics of human beings are the 
consequences of avoidable social and relational impediments. The prominent place given to 
NGOs and NHRIs during the lead-up to and in the drafting of the Convention, and their 
influence on many governments, helps to explain the reliance of the Convention on this 
progressive social model, rather than the traditional medical model that underpinned the 
disability law and policy of many states. 
 
                                                 
48 These include Article 3(c) (which makes full participation one of the guiding principles of the Convention), 
Article 4(3) (obligation of involvement of persons with disabilities in development and implementation of 
legislation and policies to implement the Convention), Article 24(1)(c) (on the right to education to enable full 
participation of persons with disabilities in society), 24(3) (full and equal participation in education), 26(1)(b)  
(habilitation and rehabilitation services which ensure participation and inclusion in the community and all aspects of 
society), Article 29 (participation in political and public life), Article 30(5) (to encourage and promote participation 
in recreational, leisure and sporting activities), Article 32(1) (involving civil society and NGO participation in 
international cooperation), Article 33(3) (full participation of civil society and DPOs in monitoring implementation 
of Convention), Article 34(4)   as well as recitals (m), (o) and (y). 
 




The Convention itself was drafted with extensive participation on the part of persons with 
disabilities and other experts on disability, in all aspects of its negotiation and drafting.50 Further, 
since the Convention came into force, the emphasis on participation in so many of its provisions 
has been used to substantial effect by DPOs and other NGOs.51 While they continue to be vocal 
critics of the reluctance of states to fully implement various requirements of the Convention, 
these organizations have actively embraced the many opportunities provided for their central 
involvement in the new disability regime, often to challenge the stance of states. DPOs and the 
umbrella groups and networks which coordinate many of them play central roles in monitoring 
and data-gathering, as well as continuing in their traditional roles of advocacy, critique, and 
mobilization. 
 
In countries with established independent monitoring mechanisms under Article 33(2) (which 
is discussed further below), civil society groups generally have a seat at the table, and in 
countries such as Spain the designated monitoring mechanism is actually a DPO umbrella group. 
Civil society groups in many countries also submit information to their governments. Although 
many governments are reluctant to seek or incorporate this feedback into their reports, the civil 
society groups’ submissions nevertheless serve as relevant inputs to the Committee.52 At the 
regional and international levels, civil society groups are trained to prepare shadow reports to the 
                                                 
50  T. Melish, n.43  above. 
 
51 The information on which this and other parts of the account below are based is drawn from a series of interviews 
conducted in September 2012 with a range of key DPO and other participants active in the international disability 
regime including: (1) Janina Arsenjeva, European Disability Forum;  (2) Regina Atalla, President of RIADIS, (the 
Latin-American network of organizations for persons with disabilities and their families); (3) Alexandre Cote,
Capacity Building Program Officer, International Disability Alliance; (4) Amy Farkas, Disability Section, 
Programme Division, UNICEF; (5) An-Sofie Leenknecht, Human Rights Officer, European Disability Forum; (6) 
Ron McCallum, Chair of the CRPD Committee;  (7) Amanda McRae, Disability Rights Researcher at Human Rights 
Watch; (8) Victoria Lee, Human Rights Officer responsible for UN Treaty Bodies at the International Disability 
Alliance; (9) Lauro Purcil, Philippine Coalition on the UN CRPD (10)  Ana Sastre Campo, CRPD Delegate, CERMI 
(DPO umbrella organization and independent monitoring mechanism in Spain); and (11) Marianne Schulze, 
Chairperson of the Austrian Independent Monitoring Committee.   
 
52 Interview with An-Sofie Leenknecht, (noting that in Belgium the government only gave civil society groups a 
short period of time to comment on the draft initial report); Interview with Marianne Schulze, (noting that in 
Austria, the government only gave civil society three weeks to comment on the draft National Action Plan, though 
civil society still managed to submit more than one hundred comments over a longer period); Interview with 
Amanda McRae, (noting that the Croatian government only consulted their allies within civil society when drafting 
their initial report); Interview with Regina Atalla, (noting that Brazilian NGOs sent several letters to the government 




CRPD Committee, and other organizations also conduct capacity building activities.53 Capacity 
building is increasingly viewed as an important investment in ensuring that civil society 
organizations understand the CRPD and are able to participate actively in its implementation, 
monitoring, and evaluation.54  
 
(b) “A framework understanding and open-ended goals” 
Whether to include a precise definition of disability was a controversial issue in drafting the 
Convention. An Experimentalist approach to lawmaking emphasizes the importance of flexibility 
and revisability in the interests of adaptation to change and inclusiveness, which militates against 
the inclusion of a precise definition of disability. A traditional human rights approach, on the 
other hand, tends to be much more skeptical of this kind of flexibility, seeing it as an opportunity 
for states to evade real commitments. Consequently many NGOs argued for a precise definition 
of disability, primarily to avoid the exclusion of certain disabilities by states parties in their 
internal policies and laws. And indeed, it seems that there was concern on the part of government 
delegations to avoid being too detailed and prescriptive in this way, for precisely these kinds of 
reasons.55 
 
The compromise ultimately agreed upon avoided a precise definition of disability. A 
provision on the meaning of disability was included in the first article of the Convention on 
‘purposes’ rather than in the second article on ‘definitions’. Article 1 includes the following 
sentence: “Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, 
                                                 
53 The European Disability Forum also conducts capacity building on monitoring and reporting with its member 
organizations in Europe. RIADIS, a network of Latin American NGOs and DPOs, conducts capacity building 
activities with civil society groups and is in the process of establishing an online platform for civil society to share 
information and best practices with each other. There are similar regional networks in Asia and Africa. Interviews 
with An-Sofie Leenknecht, Regina Atalla, and Alexandre Cote. RIADIS has to date conducted 14 regional seminars 
and trained 1,800 leaders on the Convention. 
 
54 Tunisia has been cited as one example where grassroots groups joined together to create a new DPO which 
includes all of the different disabled persons groups in the country. Unlike the DPOs of the Ben Ali period which 
were primarily focused on service provision, the new organization is focused on human rights advocacy per se : 
Interview with Victoria Lee. 
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intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their 
full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others”.56 The approach adopted 
here clearly follows the social rather than the medical model of disability,57 and fits with the 
premises of an Experimentalist Governance approach, adopting an inclusive and open-ended 
definition.  
 
Article 2 of the CRPD similarly adopts a broad and inclusive definition of discrimination 
in the following terms: ‘“Discrimination on the basis of disability” means any distinction, 
exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or 
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other 
field.58 It includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of reasonable accommodation; 
“Reasonable accommodation” means necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments 
not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to 
persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’.59 
 
Two aspects of this definition are of particular note from an experimentalist perspective. 
The first is the breadth of the definition of discrimination, including both intentional and 
unintentional (impact-based) discrimination, even while not using the language of ‘direct’ or 
‘indirect’. The second notable feature is the inclusion of denial of reasonable accommodation as 
part of the definition of discrimination. This formulation fits well with premises of 
experimentalism in its flexibility and adaptability to need and circumstance, describing both the 
wrong (denial of reasonable accommodation) and the remedy (provision of reasonable 
accommodation) in the same terms. 
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57 See also paragraph (e) of the preamble to the CRPD, which reads “(e) Recognizing that disability is an evolving concept 
and that disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders 
their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others”. 





(c) “Implementation by lower-level actors” with “continuous feedback, reporting and 
monitoring.”
Here we discuss together the third and fourth components of our definition of 
Experimentalist Governance: implementation by lower-level actors and continuous feedback and 
monitoring. There are two parts to the monitoring system established by the CRPD: a more 
conventional international human rights treaty-monitoring Committee of Experts, and a novel 
provision for national monitoring, which includes the participation of DPOs and other civil 
society actors. 
 
Articles 34-39 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities establish a 
fairly standard international human rights monitoring mechanism with a Committee of Experts60 
empowered to monitor compliance with the Convention through receiving, examining, and 
responding to state reports and reporting to the UN General Assembly and Economic and Social 
Committee, with a slightly more controversial individual right of complaint to the Committee 
contained in an Optional Protocol.61 A novel provision of the Convention, however, is that it 
mandates inclusion of persons with disabilities in the membership of the Committee of Experts.62 
At the time of writing, fifteen of the eighteen members of the Committee are persons with 
disabilities.63 According to one knowledgeable observer, the participation of persons with 
disabilities and civil society members in the Committee itself has significantly changed the 
culture of the Committee and its willingness to engage actively with civil society, as compared 
with other human rights treaty bodies.64 
                                                 
60  What renders this traditional international mechanism somewhat distinctive in the CRPD context is that Art 34(4) 
requires consideration to be given to the inclusion of persons with disabilities on the Committee.  This has since 
been done and the Committee of 17 experts is composed of various individuals with disabilities. 
 
61 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  The Convention and the Protocol 
are available on the UN website,  http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=14&pid=150 
 
62 Article 34(4) CRPD. 
 
63 Interview with Ron McCallum. 
  





Civil society organizations currently have a robust relationship with the Committee and 
interact formally and informally with its members through a number of forums. As in other U.N. 
human rights treaty monitoring arrangements, national, regional, and international civil society 
organizations are active in submitting parallel reports to the Committee prior to its review of a 
particular State’s report. The International Disability Alliance (IDA), which is the network of 
global and regional DPOs, trains local organizations to submit shadow reports to the Committee 
and has worked closely with civil society organizations in the Philippines, India, and El Salvador 
to prepare shadow reports.65 Committee members rely on civil society parallel reports to provide 
a more complete picture of a State’s compliance with the CRPD, and to help them formulate 
questions to states during the reporting process.66  
 
Civil society representatives also attend the CRPD Committee sessions held in Geneva 
twice a year.67 The IDA organizes side events during these sessions that allow Committee 
members to interact with DPO representatives from the countries under review, and is quite 
proactive in ensuring wide participation.68 Indeed, when DPOs in Tunisia were unable to attend 
Tunisia’s review before the CRPD Committee, IDA representatives traveled to Tunisia to gather 
information to present to the Committee members on behalf of the organizations.69 IDA also held 
a workshop in Hong Kong including both Chinese and Hong Kong DPOs to assist them in 
preparing an anonymous submission to the Committee prior to China’s review.70 Civil society 
organizations are thus able to provide feedback to the Committee before the adoption of the so-
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67 See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – Sessions, UN OHCHR, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Sessions.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (listing the dates of 
previous Committee sessions). 
 
68 Interview with Alexandre Cote, Interview with Victoria Lee. 
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called “List of Issues” and before the State appears before the Committee for its official review.71 
The Committee also actively welcomes the inclusion by states of persons with disabilities on 
their reporting delegations, and it seems that almost all states now make sure to have persons 
with disabilities on their delegations.72 To date, the CRPD Committee has held eight sessions and 
reviewed six countries, with a seventh (Paraguay) currently under review.73 
 
The second and more obviously novel aspect of the monitoring and implementation 
regime established by the CRPD is the provision in Article 33 on mechanisms for independent 
national monitoring and implementation.74 Clearly this emphasis on domestic or local 
implementation and monitoring, rather than relying primarily on a somewhat remote periodic 
review by an international body, conforms to a central tenet of Experimentalist Governance. 
Although the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) preferred to 
seek an integrated monitoring body on the UN level,75 other states indicated that they did not 
want a typical UN monitoring mechanism, which they considered to be a recipe for failure. 
Consequently some of the NGOs and NHRIs suggested a number of innovative ideas, including 
(i) a monitoring role for NHRIs (ii) national focal points, and (iii) the inclusion of stakeholders in 
the monitoring mechanism.76 Ultimately, both NGO groups and NHRIs played a significant role 
in the discussions and helped to ensure that the implementation mechanism for the CRPD were 
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74 CRPD, Art 33. 
 
75  This was apparently influenced by a series of debates which took place in the 1980s and 1990s, leading to the 
recommendation for an integrated, consolidated monitoring system see P. Alston “Final report on enhancing the 
long-term effectiveness of the United Nations human rights treaty system” report presented to the then UN 
Commission on Human Rights by the UN Economic and Social Council: , E/CN.4/1997/74 , and  P. Alston 
“Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, including Reporting Obligations under 
International Instruments on Human Rights”  UN General Assembly, Document A 44/668 of 8 November 1989. 
 
76  Other somewhat innovative elements in the monitoring mechanism were the provision in Article 36(4) (inspired 
by a similar provision in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) on the transparency and broad availability 
and accessibility of the comments and suggestions of the international monitoring committee in response to state 




not held hostage to the broader and more difficult debate about reform of the UN Treaty-body 
system more generally.77 
 
The provision which emerged from these discussions, Article 33 of the Convention, 
introduces the idea of ‘focal points’ by providing that states parties shall “designate one or more 
focal points within government for matters relating to the implementation of the present 
Convention” and also provides for the establishment of a coordination mechanism within 
government.78 This proposal was promoted during the negotiation of the Convention by NGOs 
and the NHRIs, and is consistent with the provision in Art 33 (3) that civil society and in 
particular DPOs are to be fully involved in the monitoring process. Article 33 also assigns a key 
role to NHRIs in the elaboration of the Convention by providing that states parties shall 
“maintain, strengthen, designate or establish … a framework, including one or more independent 
mechanisms…to promote, protect and monitor implementation of the present Convention.” 79  
 
National implementation and monitoring is also emphasized elsewhere in the 
Convention.80 Taken together, the Convention’s monitoring and implementation provisions 
                                                 
77  See Marianne Schulze “Effective Exercise of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: National Monitoring 
Mechanisms” in Global Standards- Local Action – 15 Years Vienna World Conference on Human Rights 
(Vienna/Graz 2009) 
 
78 Art 33(1) provides that:  “States Parties, in accordance with their system of organization, shall designate one or 
more focal points within government for matters relating to the implementation of the present Convention, and shall 
give due consideration to the establishment or designation of a coordination mechanism within government to 
facilitate related action in different sectors and at different levels”.  It seems that this provision was not initially well 
understood, and in particular that states parties implementing the Convention did not understand the difference 
between a focal point and a coordinating mechanism, and that different parties are interpreting the provision on a 
suitable focal point quite differently from one another. 
79  Art 33 makes indirect although not explicit reference to the so-called Paris Principles on the status of independent 
national human rights institutions, which was adopted by a resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1993.  See 
www2.ohchr.org/English/law/parisprinciples.htm 
 
80  Article 16(3) of the Convention requires states to ensure that all facilities and programmes designed to serve 
persons with disabilities are effectively monitored by independent authorities. Article 31(1) provides “States Parties 
undertake to collect appropriate information, including statistical and research data, to enable them to formulate and 
implement policies to give effect to the present Convention”. 
 




emphasize the crucial relationship between the international framework and the national level, 
and the extent to which the practical realization of the commitments contained in the Convention 
will depend on the constant engagement of independent actors. Following the logic of 
Experimentalist Governance, the framework commitments themselves take shape and are fleshed 
out through the interaction of the domestic and the international levels, bolstered by constant 
information-gathering, feedback and scrutiny. 
 
It is also clear that these novel provisions of the Convention have been brought to life in 
practice by the involvement of the various stakeholders.81 The combination of mandating focal 
points, recommending that states parties establish coordination mechanisms to facilitate action 
around the CRPD across government departments, and the requirement in Art 33(2) for 
independent monitoring mechanisms, have, in conjunction with one another, had significant 
effects. The domestic monitoring mechanisms, which are required by Article 33(2) to include 
‘one or more independent mechanisms’82 carry out a range of functions. They provide 
information and feedback to the government when the government is drafting its reports to the 
CRPD Committee or when drafting its own parallel reports, they advise governments on 
compliance of new or proposed legislation with the requirements of the Convention, and they 
organize public meetings – to include civil society actors and others – on the operation of the 
Convention. 
 
(d) “Peer review and practices for revising existing rules and practices” 
 
In addition to the peer review which takes place regularly in the context of the reporting 
and monitoring system of the Committee of Experts, the CRPD provides, in Article 40, that “the 
States Parties shall meet regularly in a Conference of States Parties in order to consider any 
matter with regard to the implementation of the present Convention.”83 It is unusual for an 
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82 This term is widely understood to refer to the National Human Rights Institutions whose criteria were established 
by the UN Paris Principles of 1993. 




international human rights treaty explicitly to mandate such regular meetings, and for such 
meetings to include substantive rather than merely procedural discussions. Article 40 was 
strongly advocated by NGOs during the drafting of the Convention. The model which the NGOs 
had in mind for a substantive annual conference was apparently inspired by a similar provision in 
the Ottawa Landmines Convention, in which the annual conference plays a particularly 
important role because there is no independent monitoring provision provided for in that 
Treaty.84 Although the CRPD has an international monitoring mechanism (the Committee of 
experts) with an optional individual complaints procedure, Article 40 was nevertheless “designed 
to allow States Parties to meet regularly to discuss best practices, difficulties, needs, and other 
matters regarding implementation of the Convention.” 85 
 
The annual Conference focuses on a different theme each year, and is organized around a 
series of talks by States Parties and thematic panels.86 In addition to providing for the election of 
new CRPD Committee members, the Conference also enables civil society organizations to 
network with each other, to place issues on the agenda, and to share experiences and best 
practices in relation to the monitoring and implementation of the Convention. It appears that the 
most interesting critical thinking and discussion takes place during the side events. Side events 
which take place prior to the CRPD Committee hearings, and which are aimed at briefing the 
Committee on a state which is coming up for review, are private side events which are not open 
to the attendance of States but only to civil society, NHRIs and UN agencies. However, other 
side events organized at the annual conference of states parties are open to all to attend, 
including states. Civil society’s role has largely been facilitated through the IDA, which 
organizes the Civil Society Forum that takes place the day before the conference begins and 
                                                 
84 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- Personnel Mines 
and on their Destruction. 
 
85  See T.Melish at n.47 above. 
 
86 The 2012 theme was “Making the CRPD Count for Women and Children.”  Conference of States Parties, UNITED 
NATIONS ENABLE, http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=1535 (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). More generally, 
see Fifth session of the Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
12-14 September 2012, UNITED NATIONS ENABLE, http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=46&pid=1595 




works with the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs in selecting the theme, panels, 
and speakers for the conference.87 
 
It is clear that the new regime established by the CRPD is an interesting novelty 
compared to other international human rights systems. The central involvement of key 
stakeholders in all aspects of the Convention’s operation has transformed it into a dynamic 
regime for bringing about relevant social and political change for persons with disabilities. In 
addition to the extensive stakeholder involvement, the iterative nature of the regime and the 
regular interaction between the local, national, and international levels in its implementation and 
operation have given it a degree of effectiveness and momentum that has been lacking in some of 
the other human rights regimes.88 
IV. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer as an 
Experimentalist Regime 
Our third exemplar of Experimentalism is the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer. The regime created under the auspices of the Montreal Protocol has 
led to a striking reduction in the production and emissions of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and 
other ozone-depleting substances (ODSs); it is widely regarded as one of the most successful of 
all international environmental regimes. The agreement is distinctive in that many of its principal 
architects and proponents assumed that developments in science would continue to shape the 
Protocol’s goals and that failure to comply with its eventual requirements was more likely to 
result from misunderstanding of its terms, or incapacity to meet obligations under them, rather 
than from self-interest. In accord with this “managerialist” perspective on compliance, the 
regime was designed from the start to be comprehensive and adaptive—able both to respond to 
changing understandings of threats to the ozone layer, and to assist signatory states to develop 
the capacity to perform as required. But with few exceptions even the advocates of the Protocol 
did not anticipate the extent to which the institutionalized interplay between ground-level 
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problem solving and the reconsideration of goals and methods for achieving them—key features 
of Experimentalism, induced by but not foreseen in the initial design—would be the key to the 
regime’s success.89 
 
(a) The origins of the problem 
 
Concern that pollution of the atmosphere could disrupt the stratospheric ozone layer, 
increasing human exposure to ultraviolet rays and thus the risk of skin cancer, along with 
changes in climate, arose in the late 1960s. The initial focus was on the risks associated with 
nitrous oxide and water vapor emitted in the exhaust trails of high-flying, supersonic aircraft then 
entering service or being designed. Further research quickly drew attention to possible 
interactions between ozone and chlorine and bromine, especially the chlorine in CFCs used as 
refrigerants, propellants for aerosols, and as mild solvents for cleaning metal parts and circuit 
boards, and the bromine in halons used in fire extinguishers and agriculturally important 
biocides. The chemical inertness that made these molecules attractive in many settings allowed 
them to remain intact as they mixed upward into the stratosphere, where exposure to intense 
sunlight split them into components, initiating the destructive interactions with ozone. 
 
Public and political reaction to scientific conjecture about this connection was abrupt and 
emphatic. Sales of aerosol cans in the United States, having grown at an average annual rate of 
25 percent during the preceding two decades, dropped by 25 percent in 1975 as information 
about the consequences of CFCs became widespread. A Federal Interagency Task Force was 
created to determine the location and extent of federal authority to regulate CFCs, beginning a 
process that would result, after two years, in a joint rule-making by the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Consumer Safety Protection 
Commission essentially banning CFCs as aerosol propellants.90 Even before this rule came into 
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effect, moreover, the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act required the administrator of the 
EPA to commission biennial studies of the ozone layer by the National Academy of Sciences and 
to regulate any substance that “may reasonably be anticipated to effect the stratosphere, 
especially ozone in the stratosphere, and such effect may reasonably be expected to endanger 
public health or welfare.”91 
 
But efforts by U.S. activists and officials, in alliance with Canada, some of the Nordic 
countries and the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), to secure international 
support for the ban on aerosols, and for regulation of ozone-depleting substances generally, 
failed in the following decade. The European public and NGOs outside the Nordic countries and 
the Netherlands did not by and large react with the same immediate alarm as their U.S. 
counterparts.92 Through the early 1980s continuing research on the stratosphere was 
inconclusive,93 and production of CFCs stagnated,94 suggesting that the problem, if any, might be 
self-limiting. European producers of CFCs, led by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) of Great 
Britain, suspected—incorrectly, as would soon be demonstrated—that their U.S. competitors 
already had developed substitutes, and sought to secure a competitive advantage through an 
international ban. ICI’s views got sympathetic hearing in official circles not only in Great Britain 
but also in other producer countries such as France and Italy. Even in the United States the tide 
of regulation was ebbing. Reagan’s victory in the 1980 elections put appointees with an anti-
regulatory agenda at the head of the EPA. About the same time DuPont, a global chemical 
company, took the lead in forming the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy, grouping large 
producers (with substantial scientific and legal resources) and many small user firms (which 
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together provided a grass-roots constituency that could influence Congressional decisions) in a 
coordinated effort to limit or entirely block additional controls.95 
   
But this reversal proved temporary. Worldwide production of CFCs, after declining in the 
1970s, began to grow again after 1982, largely for non-aerosol uses. Better understanding of the 
kinetics of reactions involving chlorine, nitrous oxide, and ozone confirmed initial conjectures 
about the vulnerability of the ozone layer and intensified concerns of accelerated depletion.96 
Improvements in measurement instruments, including the use of satellite data, led to more 
reliable estimates of ozone concentrations, established that there were no natural “sinks” to 
absorb CFCs, and gave the first indications of a decreasing trend in ozone levels, including 
evidence of an ozone “hole” above the Antarctic.97 The authoritative, “blue books” study by 
NASA and the World Meteorological Organization—commanding credibility because it 
involved essentially all the leading figures in the debate—found after an exhaustive review of the 
data and modeling projections that even a three percent annual increase in world output of the 
chemicals would likely lead to dangerous depletion of the ozone layer.98 A change of course in 
the Reagan administration brought pro-regulatory appointees back to the EPA.99 Industry 
changed its position as well: after a senior DuPont manager revealed that the company had 
ceased development of promising substitutes for CFCs in 1981 because the products were under 
the then prevailing conditions not commercially viable, the alliance of producers and users of 
CFCs endorsed a “reasonable global limit on the future rate of growth” of CFC emissions, as 
large increases would be “unacceptable to future generations.”100 
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Proponents of international regulation could now plausibly argue that the alternative to an 
agreement might well be unilateral U.S. action in the form of restrictions in trade in ODSs. As in 
the case of the tuna-dolphin regime originating in the same period, the threat of trade sanctions 
created a penalty default that brought vacillating parties to negotiate. 
 
(b) The emergence of the regime 
 
In 1985 the Vienna Convention, establishing a general obligation but no specific 
requirements had been agreed, but they key measure to protect the ozone layer was the Montreal 
Protocol to the Convention, negotiated and opened for signature in 1987, which came into force 
in 1989. Besides setting an initial schedule for the reduction and eventual elimination of CFCs 
and halons (with exceptions made for “essential” uses for which no substitutes could be found), 
the Protocol set out in spare terms the core elements of a regime for extending and modifying 
protective measures.101 The parties were to apply certain control measures, which they were to 
re-assess every four years in light of the currently available scientific, environmental, technical, 
and economic information, as determined by panels of experts in each of these domains.102 To 
permit verification of their performance, parties were to report annual production, as well as 
imports and exports of regulated chemicals, using 1986 as the baseline for evaluating reductions 
in output.103 Trade in controlled substances with countries not party to the protocol was tightly 
restricted. Developing countries, defined as those annually consuming less than 0.3 kilograms of 
controlled substances per capita, were authorized to defer control measures.104 
 
A multilateral fund, financed by the developed countries, was established to meet “all 
agreed incremental costs” that developing countries would incur in complying with control 
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measures, and to provide technical assistance to them in doing so.105 Arrangements were later 
made to support, through the Global Economic Fund administered by the World Bank, 
compliance efforts by countries with economies in transition—Russia and former states of the 
Soviet Union—that had trouble meeting their obligations but did not qualify as developing 
countries.106 At the urging of the U.S. delegation, the parties established a committee to 
determine non-compliance with the Protocol’s provisions and to propose responses.107 The 
meeting of the parties, to be held at regular intervals, retained broad authority to review 
implementation of the agreement, add or remove substances from the annexes specifying 
controls and adjust control measures, and oversee the quadrennial assessments. A secretariat was 
established to provide administrative assistance to the parties, especially in the preparation of 
meetings and the collation and distribution of data reported under the agreement. 
 
All of these components are indispensible to the systematic operation of the regime; and 
the shadow of power—in the form of the threat of trade sanctions, and the denial of funding from 
the Global Economic Fund to transition economies, as well as the threat of sanction by the EU 
against member states that did not comply with data reporting requirements—was indispensible 
to overcoming blockages, especially in the early stages of implementation. But the Technology 
and Economic Assessment Panel, established as part of the quadrennial review apparatus, and 
the sector-specific Technical Options Committees operating under it, as well as the multilateral 
fund are of particular interest here because together they came to institutionalize the broad 
stakeholder participation, revisability of goals, and continuous learning from the monitoring of 
performance that defines an experimentalist organization.  
 
Thus the principal function of the Technical Options Committees is to determine, in 
sectors ranging from solvents to refrigerants to halon fire-extinguishing agents, the feasibility of 
finding substitutes for ozone-depleting substances currently in use. They effectively set the 
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schedule for application of restrictions, and establish exemptions for “essential” uses if formally 
requested to do so through the Technology and Economic Assessment Panel by a party to the 
protocol. In denying such requests, the Technical Options Committees must provide detailed 
explanations of the reasons and a guide to meeting the requirement.108 Doing all this in turn 
requires joint exploration of innovative possibilities by producers and users of ozone-depleting 
substances in the sector. To limit the risks of capture associated with such collaboration, formal 
membership on Technical Options Committees is limited to representatives of user industries and 
groups, and of regulators and standard setters. Actual investigation, however, involves joint 
efforts by working groups of users and producers, including plant visits, pilot projects with 
regular exchanges of information on progress, and so on.109 
 
The effectiveness of such efforts is especially evident in two sectors where observers 
least expected it: solvents for industrial use and halons for fire extinguishers. Thus, for example, 
the solvents Technical Options Committee found that AT&T and a small firm had developed an 
environmentally benign solvent for cleaning circuit boards based on terpenes, a chemical 
previously ignored by both electronics producers and large producers of CFCs.110 Similarly a 
group of Technical Options Committee experts on a site visit observed a German machine that 
soldered in a controlled-atmosphere chamber, limiting oxidation of the joint, and so the need for 
fluxes and the expensive cleaning of parts and equipment with solvents after their use; user firms 
then agreed to buy the machine and exchanged reports on improvements to it.111 The Halons 
Technical Options Committee, largely composed of experts in military and civilian fire fighting, 
found that more purposive tests that did not require release of halons and better management of 
halon banks would substantially reduce production and emissions of the substance. The 
cumulative effect of such institutionalized problem solving was to induce the regulated actors to 
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produce, and continuously update the information regulators needed to establish and periodically 
adjust rules that are both public-regarding and feasible.112 
  
Once this process establishes initial regulatory goals, the targets have to be translated into 
concrete plans for dismantling or repurposing particular ozone-depleting substance production 
facilities, and for building plants to manufacture substitute products. The largest of these projects 
could run into the tens of millions of dollars; for a large economy the conversion costs run into 
the hundreds of millions. Efforts of this scale and complexity overtaxed the financial and 
technical capacities of developing countries; the risks of corruption inherent in such projects 
were especially acute there as well. The multilateral fund (in tandem with the Global Economic 
Fund) was designed to address these limits by providing project finance and technical support - 
including support for building local technical capacity - and overseeing implementation. 
 
But it was soon clear that to achieve these goals the multilateral fund would have to 
develop its own institutional capacities and those of its national counterparts. The Fund is 
administered by four implementing agencies - the World Bank, the United Nations Development 
Program, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, and the UN Environmental 
Program - reporting to an executive committee, whose composition and voting rules promote 
consensus by giving developed and developing countries group veto powers, and ultimately to 
the Meeting of the Parties. In the early years, projects were approved individually and 
implementing agencies acted essentially as advocates for national partners, with the Secretariat 
taking the lead in monitoring and project evaluation. Even in these years informative debates 
resulted in important changes in producer countries' plans, and reconsideration in the Meeting 
of the Parties of rules on the production, use, and export of controlled substances in developing 
counties.113 
 
 During the 1990s a more comprehensive system emerged, enabling funders and recipient 
countries to better monitor program design and execution and to improve performance of 
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particular projects and the organization of the decision making process. To receive Fund support, 
a developing country is required to establish a national ozone unit to collaborate with one or 
more Implementing Agencies and must prepare a national program, with detailed sectoral plans 
and a national regulatory framework, for phasing out production and use of ozone-depleting 
substances.114 This framework is frequently revised in the light of experience, as a World Bank 
report put it, plans “should be flexible enough to allow incorporation of findings and experience 
gained from the early phases of programs to improve the effectiveness of the strategies or the 
program over time.”115 Both the Implementing Agencies and the national ozone units face 
continuing pressure for innovation as attention shifts to non-point-source polluters: small and 
medium sized firms using CFCs and farms using methyl bromide, a general-purpose biocide for 
which there is no single, generally applicable substitute. 
 
The cumulative effect of all this institutional development was to produce, over the 
course of the 1990s, a highly decentralized regime, with connections with the public and private 
sectors—often down to ground level actors—in countries the world over, and making substantive 
and procedural rules that are at once mandatory and subject to frequent revision. Figure 2, taken, 
with slight modification, from Greene, presents a schematic overview. 116 
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These institutions are marked by the “close link” between (sub)systems “for reviewing 
implementation, responding to implementation problems, and revising and developing rules and 
institutions” – links that are seen as key to the Protocol’s ability to extend to meet demanding 
phase-out targets while extending the control regime to new domains.117 Experimentalist 
institutions are designed to establish just such links, which are by nature non-hierarchical. Higher 
level rule revision in light of local rule application depends on local levels having sufficient 
autonomy to report defects in the rules they observe and to explore alternatives. This rule 
revision also requires authority of the center or apex of the organization to be sufficiently limited 
that it must take account of local experience.118 It is therefore not surprising that the bureaucratic 
apex of the Montreal Protocol, the secretariat, plays a coordinating role but has little or no 
directive authority. It acts primarily as a “hub,” generally performing information pooling 
functions that facilitate exchanges between the center and local units. 119 
 
Two leading managerialist proponents of the Montreal Protocol, Abraham and Antonia 
Handler Chayes, had different expectations. They appreciated that in view of scientific 
uncertainty, international environmental regimes like the Montreal Protocol would have to adapt 
continuously to changing demands. But, influenced by the organizational models of their day, 
and particularly the experience of the most successful administrative agencies in the United 
States, they assumed that such adaptation required a robust, centrally placed secretariat to make 
sense of information that overtaxed the capacities of the parties. Indeed, their recommendation to 
parties building regimes for the international regulation of the environment was blunt: 
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“[D]elegate authority to a central body with adequate staff and resources to manage the 
implementation of treaty obligations.”120 
The success of the Montreal Protocol vindicates many aspects of their understanding of 
international problem solving, above all their intuition that regimes had the potential to play an 
active role in “modifying preferences, generating new options, persuading the parties to move 
toward increasing compliance with regime norms, and guiding the evolution of the normative 
structure in the direction of the overall objectives of the regime.”121 But the actual organization 
of the Montreal systems shows as well that the regime ultimately took a very different 
institutional form than the one assumed to be most adaptive. 
 
V. Unsuccessful or Pseudo-Experimentalist Governance  
Attempts to create Experimentalist Governance are not always successful. In some 
situations actors have sought to create arrangements intended, at least by some, to approximate 
the ideal type of Experimentalist Governance; but for a range of reasons, including political 
disagreement, its opposite—an excess of shared confidence that the essentials of the solution are 
already understood—entrenched veto-positions, or a limited commitment to fuller participation, 
they have failed to do so. Such failures often generate governance arrangements that have some 
of the architectural features of Experimentalist Governance but ultimately do not meet our 
criteria for functional Experimentalist Governance systems or practices. To put it in Weberian 
terms, they are insufficiently close to the Experimentalist Governance ideal-type exemplified in 
our three case studies for us to regard them of approximations of the model. It is important to 
point to failed efforts to institutionalize Experimentalism to underscore that this form of 
organization is not an automatic and inevitable response to all situations marked by diversity and 
uncertainty: Experimentalism appears to work well only under some additional conditions. It is, 
moreover, especially important to distinguish these “pseudo-experimental” situations from the 
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genuine article since otherwise the performance failure of pseudo-experimentalist organizations 
could be taken, incorrectly, as falsifying some of our general arguments about the functioning 
and promise of Experimentalist Governance. In this section we briefly present three such cases. 
In the next, generalizing from these examples, we discuss four conditions that make 
Experimentalist Governance more likely, although we do not put forward a fully elaborated 
theory of those possibility conditions. 
 
One of the salient cases in which formal veto powers have led to a pseudo-
experimentalist outcome is the International Labor Office (ILO). The ILO was created after 
World War I as part of a global movement to ban sweatshops, in which labor is overworked and 
exploited. In the ensuing decades the ILO agreed many detailed conventions regulating, for 
instance, the minimum age of seafarers or the organization of hiring halls for them, and 
established procedures for annual review by experts of the Parties’ compliance with their 
obligations under the convention, including suggestions for improvement in both the conventions 
and the national performance.122 Outwardly the ILO seemed like a model of an adaptive 
international organization, and Chayes and Chayes referred to it as such in illustrating the 
possibilities of a managerialist approach to treaty compliance.123 
 
But by the mid-1990s it was clear to many in the ILO that the combination of convention 
and annual review was ineffective. The conventions were often too detailed to be applicable in a 
wide range of cases; the experts lacked the kind of on-the-ground knowledge that was necessary 
for probing and informative reviews; their reports were in any case typically ignored. In response 
the leadership of the ILO tried to introduce “new governance” reforms that, had they worked, 
could well have issued in Experimentalist Governance. Conventions were consolidated as “core 
standards”, NGOs were to be draw into the review process, and countries were to develop plans 
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for addressing systematic problems and were to receive technical assistance in implementing 
them, all as part of a new governance scheme.124 
 
The reforms however failed, largely because of the traditional tri-partite governing 
structure of the ILO. As a recent paper puts it: 
 
The efforts of the ILO leadership have been waylaid by the 
organization’s corporatist structure, which gives employer associations 
and trade unions veto power over policy developments at a time in which 
these actors are increasingly unable to agree on concrete policy 
measures.125 
 
In short, despite many of the basic features of Experimentalist Governance, such as the 
articulation of framework goals, the involvement of civil society and the establishment of an 
iterative system for monitoring and reviewing implementation of the goals over time, the ILO’s 
attempt at Experimentalist-style reform failed because of the veto-position of the two key 
stakeholders within the internal governance structure of the ILO, and their unwillingness to allow 
NGOs and civil society organizations to speak for workers and other enterprises in contexts in 
which the traditional corporatist actors were absent.126 
 
Failed or pseudo-experimentalism can also result from informal actor preferences, rather 
than the exercise of formal veto powers. Examples are found among the cluster of institutions 
established by the European Union under the rubric of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 
to coordinate and learn from innovations in policy in domains such as employment and the 
organization of the labor market. The formal resemblance of the OMCs to Experimentalist 
                                                 
124 For discussion, see K. Elliott “The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labor Standards”  Institute for International 
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125 Lucio Baccaro and Valentina Mele, “Pathology of Path-Dependency? The ILO and the Challenge of ‘New 
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126 Lucio Baccaro and Valentina Mele, “Pathology of Path-Dependency?The ILO and the Challenge of ‘New 
Governance’”, ILR Review, 65(2), April 2012. 
52 
 
Governance is striking: The EU Council of Ministers sets framework goals; countries review 
their national and subnational policies; benchmarks and indicators of progress are agreed; 
countries submit action plans showing how they are progressing, or not, and remedial actions are 
proposed. 
 
But outcomes have diverged significantly among OMCs, depending largely on the actors’ 
disposition to allow others into the decision-making processes. In the European Employment 
Strategy OMC, designed to improve the operation of the labor market, well established groups 
such as trade unions blocked efforts to make participation more open and also limited the extent 
of their own contribution to the process they had helped create. In the Social Exclusion OMC, 
formed to improve life chances for marginal groups, NGOs representing the excluded had much 
less access to decision makers to begin with, so they participated wholeheartedly. In short, 
whether organizations sought inclusion depended substantially on whether they already had 
access to the policy-making process.127 
A surfeit of agreement among key actors can frustrate attempts to establish 
Experimentalist Governance as much as overt or covert disagreement. A case in point is the 
Poverty Strategy Reduction Program (PRSP) of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs).128 
The architecture of the PRSP has the familiar experimentalist elements: the setting of broad 
framework goals, the delegation of responsibility and discretion to local units and actors (also 
known as ‘country-ownership’) to implement these broad goals in diverse settings, the formal 
commitment to broad participation, and to revision in the light of experience. But the central 
actors – IFI officials and experts – were convinced that they knew the appropriate solution to the 
problems of poverty, and practices at the country-level were dominated by like-minded finance 
ministries, without effective participation by other stakeholders who might have challenged the 
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consensus.129 Hence the “center” was not much interested in “local” or country-level input, and 
did little or nothing to facilitate it; and, aware of this, the participation of the “local” or country 
level was pro forma. 
Between the poles of the continuum defined by the ideal-typical cases of Experimental 
Governance success on the one hand and pseudo-Experimentalist failure on the other there are 
manifold situations where Experimentalist Governance is currently developing, has yet either to 
succeed or to stall, and could eventually do either. Some of these arise through adaption of Mode 
One institutions, similar to the path taken by the CRPD’s innovative reconfiguration of the UN 
human rights regime. Others emerge through the re-assembly of institutions from Modes One 
and Two. A development of potentially broad significance in this connection is an incipient 
division of labor between Mode One framework organizations, such as the WTO, which set out 
overarching substantive goals, and implementing regimes.  The implementing regimes, often 
with marked Experimentalist features, establish standards for action in particular domains (for 
instance, protection of various aspects of the environment in relation to the international trade 
regime).130 The Tuna-Dolphin regime was a forerunner in creating such a division of labor, and 
the resolution of the legal controversies accompanying its development helped establish its 
legitimacy. In 1991 a panel of the GATT rejected the United States’ assertion of authority in the 
MMPA to impose environmental conditions on the process by which goods such as tuna are 
produced outside its sovereign jurisdiction. The decision, never enforced (not least because of 
the protests of environmentalists) was in effect reversed in a 1998 WTO Appellate Body decision 
concerning requirements for the use of shrimp nets designed to protect sea turtles from 
ensnarement. In 2012 an Appellate Body decision responding to a Mexican complaint against the 
restrictive U.S. tuna-labeling regime reaffirmed the legality under the WTO of environmental 
restrictions on the production of traded goods, provided that the restrictions conform to standards 
set by a competent international body, open to all potential stakeholders.131 Still other embryonic 
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Experimentalist regimes in the mid-range of the continuum arise, similar to the model of the 
Montreal Protocol, as deliberate efforts to design institutions adapted to the prevailing conditions 
of diversity and uncertainty (and mindful of the division of institutional labor just described). A 
prominent example are the commodity roundtables, established by the World Wildlife Fund, an 
international environmental NGO, together with other civil society stakeholders and leading 
producers and users of commodities such as palm oil, cotton, sugar and soy, to establish 
production standards that protect the environment, the economic interests of the developing 
economies that depend on exporting these commodities, and the well being of the individuals 
and communities immediately affected by their production.132 The extent to which Mode Three 
Experimentalist Governance shapes international organizations depends on what happens in this 
developing middle ground; and the next section presents a preliminary statement of the 
conditions under which it is likely to flourish or not. 
VI. Conclusion
In this Conclusion we undertake three tasks: 1) to review Experimentalism as a mode of 
governance; 2) to advance, though not yet to test, some hypotheses about the conditions under 
which we would expect Experimentalist Governance to develop in global settings and to be 
effective; and 3) to discuss the value of Experimentalist Governance, which we do not see as a 
panacea but which, applied under circumstances to which it is well-adapted, is normatively 
appealing. 
 
1) Experimentalism as a Mode of Governance 
We have characterized Experimentalist Governance as Mode Three, distinguished both 
from governance through traditionally integrated international regimes (Mode One) and from a 
range of more pluralistic arrangements such as those discussed in the literatures on regime 
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complexes, networks, and Global Administrative Law (Mode Two). We have defined the 
concept of Experimentalist Governance explicitly; emphasizing that five distinctive features 
must all be present: 
 
1) Openness to participation of relevant entities in a non-hierarchical process of 
decision making;  
2) Articulation of a broadly agreed common problem and the establishment of a 
framework understanding which sets open-ended goals; 
3) Implementation and elaboration by lower-level actors with local or contextualized 
knowledge;  
4) Continuous feedback, reporting, and monitoring; 
5) Established practices, involving peer review, for regular reconsideration and 
revision of rules and practices. 
 
Our three extensive case studies demonstrate that in three global issue areas, the actual 
governance patterns closely approximate to the Experimentalist Governance ideal-type and that 
Experimentalist Governance is a distinct subset or type of international regime. A key 
contribution of this paper is to show that this form of governance is not limited to administrative 
or regulatory settings in sovereign states, or the historically unique transnational setting of the 
European Union, in which member states have long shared deep cultural and institutional ties, 
even while retaining formal sovereignty. It can emerge and flourish in the international order 
both under the shadow of power—as with the threat of unilateral action by the United States in 
the case of Tuna-Dolphin and the Montreal Protocol—and without it—as in the case of the 
CRPD.  
 
2) Conditions for Experimentalist Governance 
The natural social scientific question about Experimentalist Governance is: “Under what 
conditions does it thrive as a mode of governance in world politics?” We have not developed a 
comprehensive theory to answer this question, but we have formulated four hypotheses, which 





First, we propose as a necessary condition for Experimentalist Governance that: 
governments are unable to formulate a comprehensive set of rules and efficiently and effectively 
monitor compliance with them. This condition will be met in uncertain and diverse 
environments, where it is difficult for central actors to foresee the local effects of rules, and 
where even effective rules are likely to be undermined by unpredictable changes. In none of the 
situations of Experimentalist Governance that we examine in this paper – involving tuna fishing, 
the CRPD, or the regulation of ozone-depleting chemicals – did governments have the capacity 
to formulate and monitor detailed and comprehensive rules sufficient to address the extent and 
nature of the problem in question. Thus the increases in uncertainty and diversity that contributed 
to the shift from Mode One to Mode Two forms of international organization, make the 
emergence of Experimentalist institutions more likely, though certainly not inevitable. Another 
way of stating this condition is to say that if there is too much formal or (as the PRSP example 
shows) informal agreement on cause-effect relationships and desirable strategies, 
Experimentalist Governance is unlikely to take hold. 
 
The second condition is the obverse of the first one that: governments must not be 
stymied by a lack of agreement on basic principles. In the ILO and OMC pseudo-experimentalist 
cases, for example, key actors did not agree on the need jointly to investigate solutions beyond 
the limits of existing bargains and compacts. Hence they hindered the collection of local 
information and obstructed effective use of what nonetheless was collected. In other words, 
Experimentalist Governance can no more work if there is too little agreement than if there is too 
much. Experimentalist Governance progresses in the “Goldilocks Zone” – where there is neither 
too much nor too little agreement, and the balance, like the temperature of Goldilocks’ porridge, 
is “just right.” 
A third condition follows from the first two: civil society actors must be deeply involved 
in the politics of the issue. Successful Experimentalist Governance regimes and practices depend 
on extensive and open participation of civil society actors in agenda setting, revision, and on-
going problem solving. The more uncertain and diverse the setting, the more likely it is that 
ground-level actors, such as NGOs and firms, will begin to identify and solve problems that 
central, state actors, even in neo-corporatist concert with peak associations of labor and capital, 
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ignore or will not address for fear of jeopardizing established interests. Increases in uncertainty 
and diversity also make it more likely (but of course far from certain) that authorities and interest 
groups that might otherwise resist the participation of civil society actors as a check on their 
discretion will tolerate or even welcome the entry of new players in recognition of the limits of 
their own problem-solving capacities. Hence the cooperation of (newly formed or previously 
marginal) civil society actors either as agenda setters or problem solvers (with the same groups 
sometimes in both roles) will normally be indispensable to the success of Experimentalist 
regimes. In the Tuna-Dolphin regime NGOs sounded the alarm about the dangers of dolphin sets, 
and helped move passage of the MMPA. Fishers and observers placed on boats by the IATTC 
identified dangerous practices and helped devise a workaround. NGOs organized the La Jolla 
Agreement to stabilize the regime when the flag states were deadlocked. In the CRPD context, 
NGOs helped write the rules, including the novel rules that gave themselves a major role in 
monitoring compliance and revising the rules. In the Montreal Protocol, NGOs played a key role 
in putting the dangers of ozone depletion before the public, and putting pressure on Congress for 
a regulatory response. Firms and associations of firms (the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy) 
eventually became proponents of reform, and firms were central participants in the sectoral 
working groups that actually devised proposed alternatives to ozone depleting substances or 
ways to substantially reduce their production and use. The integration of civil society actors into 
Experimentalist regimes as both agenda setters and problem solvers blurs the distinction between 
public and private regulation. It makes this kind of regime more effective than typical Mode One 
and Mode Two regimes in adapting international agreements to the lessons of local experience. 
 
All this implies as a fourth condition that: the issue must not be a matter of high politics. 
In situations where governments are in direct control of relevant decisions, uncertainty arises 
from the strategic interactions of sovereign states, and the costs of error are very high. Control of 
nuclear weapons during the Cold War is the classic example of the situation and the adaptive 
response: detailed treaties, including monitoring regimes to provide mutual assurance of 
compliance with their terms. Issues such as the management of trade and climate change that 
have come to be defined as matters of high politics—global problems to be addressed by 
binding, global agreements—are, as we noted at the outset, intractable under current conditions. 
There are correspondingly efforts, as part of the new division of labor between Mode One and 
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Mode Two institutions, to redefine and them as the joint effect of a constellation of regional and 
sectoral problems.  Problems may be defined in general terms at a global level, but responses 
take place through  specialized local, regional, or international regimes that (on the model of the 
Montreal Protocol) reset their goals in light of rigorously evaluated experience, rather than 
deriving them from a precisely defined overall target set ex ante. If this reframing fails 
Experimentalist Governance will not be part of an eventual solution to climate change; if it 
succeeds, we expect its success to go hand in hand with the diffusion of Experimentalist 
regimes.133 
3) Experimentalist Governance: not a Panacea but Normatively Promising 
Elinor Ostrom was fond of saying that, however valuable the principles she articulated were 
for local self-governance, they were not a panacea for all sorts of collective action problems.134 
Experimentalist Governance is also not a panacea. Even if suitable in principle and adapted to a 
given domain, Experimentalist Governance is likely to be impractical or unworkable where key 
actors are unwilling or reluctant to cooperate—because they have veto rights over relevant 
decisions, prefer not to put established interests at risk, or agree too much on the answers to the 
questions they pose—and when it is impossible to place the reluctant parties under the threat of a 
“penalty default.” As we have seen, penalty defaults can change parties’ preferences by raising 
the cost to them of persisting in habitual but ineffective strategies, inducing them to consider 
alternatives and thus increasing the chance that they enter the “Goldilocks” zone where joint 
exploration of further possibilities is mutually attractive. So long as the parties do not face such a 
penalty, they are free to translate reluctance to participate in new arrangements into overt or 
covert obstructionism. But note that the “so-long-as” condition is important here: as we have 
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seen in the case of the Tuna Dolphin and Montreal Protocol regimes, new information can 
mobilize the public, touching off a cascade of political and administrative responses that can put 
previously invulnerable parties at risk of penalty defaults. 
 
Even where key actors embrace Experimentalist Governance, institutions reflecting its 
principles could fail because of unexpected, negative consequences. Experimentalist processes 
can be captured by groups with hidden agendas, hoping to capitalize on processes that give them 
the ability to shape agendas or to exercise vetoes at crucial points. The new forms of 
transparency created by regular peer review of results and increased participation of civil society 
groups presumably create new obstacles to familiar forms of capture; but they also presumably 
create new forms of vulnerability to outside influence and new opportunities to temper criticism 
in return for access to decision makers. More fundamentally, the actors may mistake their 
situation and institute Experimentalist processes on the assumption that there is no 
comprehensive, analytical solution to a set of problems, when in fact such a solution exists but is 
unknown to them. In short, human fallibility cuts very deeply into institutional planning, even in 
the experimentalist mode. 
 
Yet one of the greatest normative merits of Experimentalist Governance is that it 
recognizes human fallibility. Indeed, its reliance on non-hierarchical decision making and 
implementation by local level actors, as well as its provisions for monitoring, peer review, and 
revisability, all derive from a profound awareness of human fallibility.  We are often poorly 
informed, unwilling to pay costs to produce public goods, limited in our analytical ability to 
predict human behavior, especially where strategic interactions are involved. In other words, we 
may recognize problems but not know how to deal with them.   Under such conditions, 
Experimentalist Governance advises that often we should consider  establishing a process that 
helps us generate alternatives we might not have imagined exist and improving our ability to 
choose among them by rigorously exposing each to criticism in light of the others. 
 
A second appealing feature of Experimentalist Governance, especially in international 
cooperation, is its potential to increase participation in, and thus the democratic legitimacy of, 
such institutions. A familiar objection to delegation by treaty of aspects of sovereign authority to 
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international organizations is that the transfer of authority diminishes the scope for domestic 
democracy. A rejoinder interprets delegation of particular sovereign powers to international 
bodies as a complement and extension of constitutional democracy: Just as the checks and 
balances provided by the domestic constitution and analogous entrenching legislation can 
improve the quality of collective self rule, protecting the rights of minorities or safeguarding 
diffuse and long-term interests against the immediate power of the majority or concentrated 
groups, so too can participation in international regimes.135 The proviso of course is that such 
gains come at the price of limits on important forms of democratic participation. So the test of 
the legitimacy of constitutional institutions, domestic or international, is whether the increases in 
fairness and responsiveness they provide outweigh the costs they impose on majoritarian rule. 
 
International cooperation organized on the principles of Experimentalist Governance may 
reduce the trade-off between overall responsiveness and democratic participation broadly 
conceived. To work, Experimentalist Governance must open agenda-setting and problem solving 
to a wide range of actors, particularly, we have argued, from civil society. Enlarging the circle of 
decision making, and keeping it accessible to new participants is a condition of success. 
Moreover, through regular peer review of the interchange between “central” or framework-
making entities and “local” or implementing ones Experimentalist Governance requires 
deliberative justification of current norms, or their revision, and so induces parties to reconsider 
their possibilities and preferences in the light of goals and procedures they gradually articulate 
together. In this way Experimentalist Governance makes possible a form of forward-looking or 
dynamic accountability unavailable in traditional, principal-agent regimes—regimes which, in 
any case, are notoriously ineffective in international settings, because states can enter agreements 
on the basis of a “thin,” formal domestic consensus, and can rarely monitor effectively the 
regimes thus authorized.136 In Experimentalist Governance at its best the openness of decision-
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making improves dynamic accountability, and improvements in accountability enlarge 
participation in decision making. This is neither traditional, representative democracy, nor 
counter-majoritarian constitutionalism, but it is surely a form of deliberative, joint rule making 
that may contribute in transnational and global contexts, to self-governance under the rule of law. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
